Current cyber defenses result in binary access for attackers who have compromised a host: either the attacker has full access to the machine or the intrusion is detected and the machine is removed from the network. This is the result of an apparent duality when determining if a system is compromised; i.e., either it is or it is not. However, analysts usually make decisions based upon many pieces of data and their own experience, which may lend itself to higher resolution in the decision-making process. We propose using machine-oriented indicators of compromise to trigger progressive, incremental cocooning of a machine by replacing real network services with their emulated counterparts, which are indistinguishable from real services to attackers. The emulated services will be instrumented to gather additional details about an attacker's tools and techniques. Incremental cocooning reduces the effect on normal users' experiences.
INTRODUCTION
Previous work on network deception has focused on perimeter detection and low-fidelity host emulation via honeypots [1] . While this approach may be effective against unsophisticated adversaries, we must also defend against more sophisticated adversaries and advanced persistent threats (APTs). 1 Furthermore, attacks often occur in stages, each of which produces indicators that may be subtle or inconclusive. Due to this subtlety and the sheer volume of data, human defenders may not always notice these indicators, which motivates using automated tools. Due to this uncertainty, a progressive Thus, we need to develop defenses that hinder adversaries once they are already inside our networks. Sophisticated adversaries are wary of changes to the environment and will disappear if they suspect a trap. Furthermore, due to the large volume of data and alerts that are generated, human analysts are often unable to distill relevant indicators to detect compromises or may detect them only after an adversary has gained a foothold on the target network. Once on the target network, APTs often will attempt to spread out or move laterally 3 . Their goal is often to exfiltrate information. 4 Consequently, we propose new tools that progressively defend our networks on a machine-by-machine basis using incremental indicators of compromise. We propose using machine uniqueness (machine-oriented biometrics) for identification and detection, and emulating internal services (cocooning) with high fidelity so that attackers are unaware of the deception, unable to access sensitive information, and waste their resources. The emulated services are instrumented so that defenders can observe attackers and learn about specific tools and techniques. We refer to our machine-oriented biometrics and cocooning system as MOB-C.
Our goal is to develop a tool that can detect deviations from a machine's normal behavior (or detect similarity to known events) on a per-service or potentially host-wide basis, and then block access to the corresponding services, replacing them with emulated services. If done correctly, attackers will be unable to distinguish between the real and emulated services and will continue their attacks. Our tool is instrumented so that we can precisely observe how an adversary interacts with the emulated services. Thus, our tool responds automatically, incrementally, and more rapidly than a human analyst who often only makes a binary response of fully-enabling (i.e., no action) or fully-disconnecting a machine. In addition, we are developing metrics to evaluate two aspects of our work. The first set of metrics quantify the effectiveness of our approach and may also provide a means for evaluating other dynamic defense techniques. The second set of metrics will quantify the fidelity of our emulated services from the perspective of an APT. We will also discover more 2 http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/expertstell-senate-government-networks-ownedresistance-futile-032112 (accessed 8/7/12). 3 Moving laterally is to gain a presence on additional hosts on the network, and longitudinal movement is the entry mechanism, e.g., spearphishing. Stuxnet propagated and communicated via Windows RPC. http://www.symantec.com/content/ en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/ whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf (accessed 4/11/12). 4 http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/whitepapers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf (accessed 4/11/12). about our adversaries' tools and techniques through instrumentation of the emulated services.
Threat Model
We assume an APT threat model. These actors are often interested in exploiting a network to obtain proprietary information and frequently obtain network access via spearphishing. These targeted attacks are focused on people who have knowledge of or access to some specific information. For example, a group of people might be targeted because of their common knowledge or access to a particular set of information. Once inside the target network, the attackers solidify their access and spread laterally, seeking more information.
Related Work
Machine learning (ML) for intrusion detection has been an active area of research for many years. Systems utilizing host-based data typically employ system calls as features [2] . Systems using network data are often designed for use at network ingress and egress points and look for evidence of, for example, malware downloads and command and control. Given their location, they cannot detect lateral movement. Some systems also analyze the raw packets and use statistical tests to detect abnormality [3, 4] . Researchers have considered many approaches, including Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Support Vector Machines (SVM), and Bayesian approaches [5] [6] [7] [8] . Despite this work, ML is not yet widely deployed for intrusion detection and network defense, largely due to high false positive rates (FPR), which create additional work for analysts, and the enormous variability and continously changing nature of normal host behavior and network traffic [8] . Despite these challenges, ML-based approaches are appropriate for our threat model since signature-based systems are ineffective against 0-day attacks available to APTs. We focus on reducing the FPR and continously adapting to normal changes in benign host and network data.
Much of the previous work incorporating deception has utilized honeypots. While these tools try to deceive an adversary, they largely focus on a different threat model and attack stage. Consequently, they provide relatively low levels of fidelity and are externally facing. The GQ tool proposed by Kreibich et al. [9] , however, does provide high-fidelity emulation to malware. GQ was developed to address the problem of containment, that is, keeping a malware sample both running and in the test environment but out of the production environment. GQ can allow a malware sample or test to have varying levels of connectivity internally and externally (i.e., to the Internet). Our work differs in that it is designed to identify and mitigate lateral movement in an operational environment, while GQ is designed to allow an analyst to forensically investigate and explore a malware sample that has already been identified.
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. In Section 2 we describe the architecture of MOB-C. In Section 3 we describe our testbed environment. In Section 4 we describe the evaluation of MOB-C. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
ARCHITECTURE
We developed our architecture to mitigate attackers' lateral movement rather than longitudinal movement. In other words, we start with the assumption that an attacker is already inside the network and has a presence on at least one host.
Machine Biometrics.
The objective of this effort is to develop a modeling and monitoring methodology appropriate for deployment on individual machines that determines the normal, unique behavior of the machine, continuously updates this model to reflect normal changes in behavior without incorporating attack behavior, and reliably and consistently detects anomalies. We hypothesize that each machine has a unique pattern of activities, processes, and network interactions, which we term a machine-oriented biometric, and that this uniqueness can be effectively modeled. We further hypothesize that deviations from these models caused by an adversary's attempts to move laterally can be distinguished from normal changes in machine behavior.
Our machine-oriented biometrics system is outlined in Figure 1 . Three separate data streams are used in the analysis. The host input sequence consists of system calls and processes currently running on the host machine. The network input sequence contains all network activity seen by the host. The merged data stream contains summary statistics, calculated over a short, sliding window, from both data sets. We partition the analysis into a triage layer, a ML layer, and a decision layer. The triage layer performs a rapid data reduction to limit the amount of data processing performed by an ensemble of ML algorithms in the second layer. The results of the triage and ML analyses are combined with the output from a signature-based intrusion detection system (IDS) in a final decision-making layer. Additionally, we maintain a memory of past results to aid in decision making.
Cocooning. Figure 2 shows our cocooning architecture. Once the machine biometrics component detects potentially malicious behavior, it sends a trigger message to the switching mechanism. The switching mechanism modifies the network configuration by replacing services impacted by the potentially-malicious behavior with emulated versions of those services. The machine that triggered the warning then has access to the emulated service rather than the normal service. This does not mean that the machine is completely removed from the pro-
We emulate these services with high fidelity by providing a full machine rather than simple protocol emulation. We choose to emulate in this manner for two reasons. First, a full machine is a much more accurate faximilie than protocol emulation. Second, the attacker's goal is to move laterally, that is, to expand his presence on the network, perhaps in search of specific or interesting information. Thus, the attacker is not fooled by simply emulating protocols, since he is expecting to land on another full system.
TESTBED
In this section we describe our testbed. Using our testbed, we have demonstrated the ability to switch out one service for another. Our discussion in this section focuses on the HTTP service, although the approach applies to other services.
Machine Biometrics
To create unique machine profiles, we use aspects of machine behavior, such as system calls and processes, and features related to network interactions, such as general flow statistics, protocolspecific flow statistics, and raw packet data. We collect a host's packets using Wireshark and host data using ProcMon 5 from a Windows 7 machine. Merging is done by timestamps. We use a custom dataset created from logs of one of our machines during both normal operation, and while injecting malicious network and host events using Metasploit 6 . In Figure 2 , Metasploit runs on the outside attacker's machine (not shown) and our IDS runs on the compromised pivot machine.
Triage.
The triage layer is a data reduction step focused on quickly eliminating true negatives from the data stream. We apply bloom filters to packet data and sequences of system calls to detect newness. We may also perform protocol-specific filtering and remove, for example, all known, normal HTTP flows so that only unknown flows are passed to the ML layer. We may also completely ignore certain protocols if we are not extracting any features from them. During the training phase the bloom filters are populated, and during operation they are used to check the collected data for newness. Items that are newer are inherently more interesting and are thus more likely to be passed to the next layer. We also generate relative frequency distributions of packet data and system calls during training and operation. We compare the operational data to the training data using a simplified Mahalanobis distance [4] .
Machine Learning.
In this layer, we deploy ML analyses primarily as a means to reduce false positives. Due to the data reduction in the triage layer, the volume of data to be processed represents a small fraction of the initial dataset, so the computational expense of the machine learning algorithms is tolerable. We have implemented an ensemble consisting of an ANN, an SVM, a self-organizing map, a random forest, k-nearest neighbors, and naive Bayes approaches.
Signature-Based IDS.
A signature-based IDS built using Snort 7 runs in parallel with the ML event detection system. This keeps the FNR of the system to known attacks low and enhances our ability to continuously retrain our ML system, since attacks detected by the signature-based IDS can be used as labelled malicious data for the ML algorithms. 5 See http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/ sysinternals/bb896645.aspx (accessed 8/9/12). 6 See http://www.metasploit.com/ (accessed 8/9/12). 7 See http://www.snort.org (accessed 8/9/2012).
Decision Making.
The decision layer uses an evolutionary algorithm (EA) as a trainable discriminator. The EA accepts intrusion probabilities from the triage and ML layers, as well as the results obtained by the signaturebased IDS and a history of past data and results, and determines if an intrusion is represented in the dataset. If an intrusion is detected, then the cocooning system is triggered and the emulated service(s) is switched into operation. Otherwise, system operation proceeds as normal. In both cases, the ML models are updated.
FPR Reduction.
We propose several approaches for reducing the FPR. The triage layer in part functions to reduce the amount of data that must be analyzed by the ML approaches. This may eliminate some of the variability in normal machine behavior and ease the ML classification task. The signature based IDS helps to ensure a low FPR against known attacks and can be used to provide an ongoing source of labeled training data for the ML approaches. The memory of past history allows us to look at trends in data and may allow us to be more selective in making attack determinations. This memory can also accept input from analysts who can use it to re-label and re-train the ML algorithms in response to false positives and false negatives. When provided with all of this data, the trainable discrimiator in the decision-making layer may more subtly distinguish between normal and attack behavior than can non-trainable discriminators. Finally, we envision our system being deployed on individual machines throughout enterprise scale networks, which may result in several oportunities to detect attacks as they spread throughout the network.
Cocooning
Triggering.
We implemented the triggering mechanism as a simple Python class that contains a client and a server. The biometrics software on each host runs as a client and sends a simple message to the server indicating which services should be emulated and which should be returned to normal. The server then creates a subprocess, calling a script that implements switching from normal to emulated or viceversa for each of the services indicated in the client's message.
Switching.
We use OpenFlow 8 for our switching mechanism because it provides a software-defined network switch. We ran OpenFlow on a dedicated Ubuntu 10.04 machine. OpenFlow can also run on dedicated hardware, making it appealing for future integration into production networks. We wrote custom scripts to switch between normal and emulated services using the built-in flow controller.
Emulation.
Though cloud computing is an exciting topic in current research and information technology in general, its use is not pervasive; in many organizations, most computation is done on desktop machines, which we refer to as bare metal. Consequently, we chose for our normal service to be hosted on bare metal to maintain relevance to the current state of these environments. However, we run the emulated service in a virtual machine (VM) on a host that is different from the one running the real service. We made this choice because it is much easier to provision and tear down VMs. Using VMs also allows us additional opportunities for observing attacker behavior and tools, which we will discuss in more detail below. We use Xen as our hypervisor in order to support the introspection tools. We performed tests using Windows 7 and Ubuntu 10.04 for the platforms for our real and emulated services. We used Apache for our web server. We have worked with stateless protocols, and thus, we have not needed to transfer state from real to emulated services. Transferring state is an additional complication, but has been addressed previously [10] .
Introspection.
To gain greater insight into what an adversary is doing once cocooned, we instrumented the emulation VM with LibVMI 9 and Volatility 10 . These tools allow us to inspect the memory and monitor system calls in the emulation VM.
EVALUTATION METHODOLOGY

Machine Biometrics
The primary means of evaluating the effectiveness of our ML event detection system is through classic machine learning training and testing methodologies. Obtaining the labelled data required for building and testing the models for applications such as this is often extremely expensive, and much of our work was devoted to this task. We created a dataset consisting of labelled (normal, malicious) feature vectors created from both host and network data as described above. We employ standard repeated random sub-sampling validation techniques to maximize the utility of our labeled data.
We will also evaluate our system on the basis of latency, memory footprint, and FPR and false negative rate (FNR). We do not require real-time detection and cocooning of events. Rather, it is sufficient for our system to maintain streaming analysis in the triage layer and to relax this constaint in the ML, decision making, and cocooning layers becuase sucessful detection and response to attacks is preferred over compromising accuracy for speed.
We envision this system evolving into a tool appropriate for deployment on hosts throughout an enterprise scale network. Consequently, its memory footprint and computational overhead should be commensurate with standard endpoint protection tools.
Effectiveness Metrics.
One of the goals in cocooning a host is to deceive an attacker so that he continues his attack and wastes his resources. This leads naturally to an effectiveness metric: the amount of time an attacker spends inside the cocooning system. With our instrumentation, another effectivness metric might be the number of tools or different functions captured or observed.
For a system like ours to be of operational value it must have a low FPR. Consider for instance a hypothetical host machine that is used 40 hours per week each week of the year running our system with a detection window of one minute. There will be more than 10 3 detection windows each week and more than 10 5 each year. In a network of thousands of machines even one false positive per machine per week is likely unacceptable. Consequently, our desired FPR is related to window size with a goal of no more than one false positive per machine per month.
We envision a system deployed on each endpoint in an enterprisescale network to detect attacks. This implies that several hosts have an opportunity to detect malicious activity. Consequently, we can tolerate a larger FNR and, to ease adoption and due to the base rate fallacy, we prefer lowering the FPR over lowering the FNR [11] . Consequently, we consider a FNR less than 1% to be acceptable.
Cocooning
Early in our work, we realized that the normal and emulated services could not be exactly the same for us to achieve our goal of not giving an adversary access to sensitive information. If there were no 9 See http://code.google.com/p/vmitools/ (accessed 9/20/12). 10 See http://code.google.com/p/volatility/ (accessed 9/20/12). differences between normal and emulated services, then the attacker would have access to the same information through either of those services. Consequently, part of our research is developing metrics to evaluate the similarity of the two services. In building our testbed and demonstrating its operation we used some of these metrics. For example, the two network stacks must use the same information: same MAC address, same IP address, same TCP or UDP ports, etc. If these are not the same, the service would not switch or perform correctly. For example, if the MAC address were not the same, that difference would be visible in ARP traffic or ARP cache misses.
We plan on measuring statistics for other network information, such as TCP round-trip time, network stack fingerprint, and latency. This information would be available to an attacker and could be used to distinguish between normal and emulated services.
SUMMARY
In this paper, we presented a prototype system for detecting an attacker moving laterally by monitoring both host and network data, and then modifying an attacker's access on a per-service basis. This has the effect of denying an attacker access to sensitive information while still allowing us to revert to a completely normal state. Furthermore, instrumentation allows us to monitor an attacker more closely than on normal systems. Information obtained from our instrumentation may increase our confidence that an attacker is attempting to move laterally, which may lead us to completely remove the offending host from the network. Conversely, we may determine that the system is behaving normally and restore access to the real services. We believe that MOB-C presents new challenges to APT threats by attempting to deceive, delay, and monitor their activity, features which current tools do not provide.
